![]() ![]() ![]() This paper proceeds first by describing, in section two, the phenomenology of the Waterfall Illusion as traditionally understood, highlighting the difference between illusions of motion and distinctively temporal illusions. It is thus more plausible that temporal structure is an inherent, fundamental feature of the information processing mechanism underlying consciousness (whatever account we give of this), rather than a result of localised processes. As a general constraint on models of temporal phenomenology and explanations of the cognitive mechanisms underlying such models, we should see temporality as a global precondition for subjective experiences. Footnote 4 The dynamic snapshot theorists have therefore missed their target by focusing on a visual motion illusion. The kind of theories that seek to explain temporal phenomenology are not the kind that can be supported by evidence from any one particular sensory modality or cognitive function, such as visual motion. Underlying the misappropriation of MAEs is a methodological error regarding the kind of evidence that constitutes appropriate fodder for models of temporal phenomenology. Ultimately, the connection between subjective time and motion aftereffects is too strained for advocates of the dynamic snapshot view to effectively make a case for generalising to temporal phenomenology. The rare condition of akinetopsia (motion blindness) helps to demonstrate that the experience of visual motion is in fact unrelated to distinctly temporal phenomenology, so drawing analogies between their mechanisms is misguided. Second, it will be argued that MAEs like the Waterfall Illusion should be seen as illusions of motion, and therefore a result of visual processing, rather than temporal illusions per se. Footnote 3 This becomes apparent when the phenomenology of the Waterfall Illusion is appropriately interpreted. First, it will be argued that the phenomenology of motion aftereffects should in fact compel us to recognise that subjective temporal properties encoded at an instant are not sufficient for a subjective experience of motion, contrary to the position of the dynamic snapshot theorists. The argument against the dynamic snapshot theorists’ use of MAEs has two strands. ![]() Footnote 2 The contention of this paper is that motion aftereffects like the Waterfall Illusion have in fact been misappropriated and do not provide evidence for the conclusions of the dynamic snapshot theorists. The dynamic snapshot view therefore rejects the orthodox “specious present” doctrine, first popularised by William James ( 1890: 609), which claims the experienced present must be extended in time rather than instantaneous, as phenomena like change, persistence, continuity, and succession require intervals of time. The dynamic snapshot view holds that temporal phenomenology can be analysed as snapshot-like experiences that encode information about change, motion, succession, etc., at an instant. Recently, this phenomenon has been recruited Footnote 1 in support of the dynamic snapshot view of subjective time (e.g. It involves the apparent motion of a static object following a subject’s prolonged exposure to moving stimuli. The Waterfall Illusion is a type of motion aftereffect (MAE) known at least since the time of Aristotle ( 1908) ( On Dreams: Part 2). Furthermore, I suggest that future theories of subjective time should see temporal phenomenology as the result of non-localised processes closely tied to the mechanism underlying consciousness generally. motion-blindness, that the Waterfall Illusion fails to support the dynamic snapshot theory as intended. Previous theories have typically appealed to a subjective present occupying an interval of time that is, a “specious present.” I argue, through analysis of motion aftereffect illusions and the rare condition of akinetopsia, i.e. This dynamism is meant to account for familiar features of the phenomenology of time, such as succession, continuity, and change. Recently, proponents of the so-called dynamic snapshot theory have appealed to the Waterfall Illusion, a kind of motion aftereffect, to support a particular view of temporal consciousness according to which experience is structured as a series of instantaneous snapshots with dynamic qualities. However, the way illusions are interpreted is often controversial. The philosophical investigation of perceptual illusions can generate fruitful insights in the study of subjective time consciousness. ![]()
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